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I
When Hippocrates lashed out against superstition and wrote
his treatise on epilepsy, he seems to have provided a formula and he
indicated a trend for the whole history of the relationship between
medicine and psychiatry. The trend, under different guises and
expressed in different languages and terminology, is as potent today
as it was twenty-four hundred years ago. Epilepsy, Hippocrates
almost shouted, is not a "sacred disease," but a natural one. The
word "sacred" is now forgotten and "psychological" has taken its
place; the word "natural" has been supplanted by "organic."
This implied conflict still persists in all its essentials. Hippoc-
rates fought against the mystic templar tradition. The scientific
struggle continues now between two branches of medicine. The
occasional thrusts made against the Church and Christianity, or
against religion in general, as the supposed chief agent responsible
for extreme psychological orientations, are only partially correct, if
correct at all. The struggle originated by Hippocrates was acute
centuries before the advent of Christ, and over a millennium before
the so-called DarkAges. It is doubtful whethertheconflict between
medicine and psychiatry in the Middle Ages and during the greater
part of theRenaissance was dueprimarilyto theestablished Christian
theology. The constant, hair-splitting argumentation ofthe Middle
Ages, which sought to establish a differential diagnosis between
"natural" and "supernatural" diseases, in no way differed in its sub-
stance from the corresponding attitude which Hippocrates brought
into focus when he wrote his treatise on The Sacred Disease.
It is quite obvious that we deal here with a fundamental problem
which transgresses the confines of a given historical period and of
a given set of cultural conditions. One is led rather forcibly to the
suspicion that we are dealing here with a certain limitation of man's
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psychological, or intellectual, horizon, a limitation difficuit if not
impossible fully to overcome, and one in extreme need of proper
clarification. One need not be deterred from investigating this phe-
nomenon merely because it points to something man cannot do or
penetrate. There are many things which are beyond our direct
apprehension, yet we have found highly serviceable scientific ways of
dealing with them.
The question before us at the present moment is not what episte-
mological and metaphysical problems are involved in the conflict
between the organicist and the psychologist, but rather a descriptive
survey of what this struggle appears to be from the empirical point
of view.
11
What was the substance of the attitude expressed by Hippocrates
in his treatise on The Sacred Disease? He made a sharp denial and
an equally terse assertion. Hippocrates denied that epilepsy was a
sacred disease; in so doing he asserted the true medical attitude as
we have developed itthrough manycenturies, the humanistic attitude
which justified the very existence of medicine the therapeutic
intent, the need and wish to cure man of his ills. In so far as
Hippocrates denied epilepsy its sacred, untouchable nature, he was a
humanist who acted as a liberator, demanding that his right to heal
man not be violated by any prejudice or superstition. By stating
what epilepsy was not, Hippocrates made one of the most positive
contributions to the history of medicine.
But as so frequently happens in the history of peoples as well as
in the history of individuals, many a positive action is held in check
by another which partly negates it. By stating that epilepsy was a
bodilydisease, Hippocrates stated something he did not really know.
Whether epilepsy is an organic or a psychological disease, or a com-
bination ofboth, is aproblem not yet solved, even today. The posi-
tive statement of Hippocrates eliminated mysticism, but with it he
rejected all psychologyandemphasized the traditional self-limitation
of medicine. He underscored our propensity to believe that when
we speak of an illness we mean only physical, organic illness. This
sharp dichotomy into physical and mental tends to split man away
from his own psychology and consequently does injury to man as
a person, for it tends to translate every human reaction into terms
of bile, phlegm, heat and cold, muscle and bone, blood and excreta.
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This is exactly the result of Hippocrates' statements, and this is no
mean sin against the very humanism which is the prime mover of
the Art of Medicine.
In the main, the Hippocratic tradition stood the test of the cen-
turies and kept medicine in a state of humanistic inspiration which
contained within itself anti-humanistic seeds. Man as a whole, man
in his totality, was-perhaps inadvertently-abandoned at the very
moment when classical medicine was born as a liberator and a revo-
lutionary rising against templar superstition. The emphasis on the
organic, and the organic only, very soon divorced medicine from
psychiatry. The post-Hippocratic period imperceptibly led to a
complete return of psychiatry to the domain of templar medicine,
while medicine proper proceeded along its self-limited path with
steady, even if at times very slow, progress. The medical man was
investigating bodily ills and steadily accumulating clinical data on
these ills. The conception of man as an individual had not been
born, and as we have seen in Hippocrates, the prerequisite for the
formation of such a concept-the indivisibility of the human person-
ality-had been set aside at the very moment scientific, dinical
medicine was born.
Man was considered a part ofnature, but onlythe corporeal man.
Thus, in the course of centuries, medicine followed, as it should
have, the vicissitudes of natural sciences. It was successively astro-
logical, alchemical, physical, anatomical, physiological, and finally
chemical-as it is primarily today. Man, we were led silently to
assume and to believe, was the astrological, physical, or chemical
microcosm ofthe greatastrological, physical, or chemical macrocosm.
What happened to the essential humanism out of which medicine
was born? It remained, of course, the prime-moving psychological
force of medicine, but it was of necessity over-shadowed by what
some choose to call the purely scientific attitude. The doctor prac-
tised medicine in the same manner as any good artisan practised his
art; he became either a good technician, like Ambroise Pare, or an
excellent investigator, likeVesalius orAlbrechtvon Haller. Toward
the eve ofthe Renaissance, the accent was so far displaced from man
as a human being that the doctor was more interested in tradition
and an old authoritative text than in the sick man he saw before him.
That is why-despite the great contributions of Michael Servetus,
Vesalius, and even Paracelsus-the medical man, having lost his
chief object, man, degenerated into the pedantic poseur at whose
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expense Moliere later had such a very good time. It was for the
same reason that the scholarly, thoughtful doctors, such as Thomas
Willis, for instance, in the very act ofraisingpathology to its greatest
scientific heights, became interested more in cadavers than in living
men. It is impossible to over-estimate the great contributions to
medical science which were made by these generations of workers,
but it is equally impossible to over-estimate the great lack of under-
standing of mental diseases that reigned in medicine. The ancient
chasm between medicine and psychiatry has not decreased throughout
twenty-four hundred years; in some respects it has even increased,
and at certain periods it reached a singular peak of cruelty and blood-
shed. It would be quite wrong to repeat the traditional and not
very telling explanation that ignorance was responsible for all this
cruelty and perversion of man's science. It must not be forgotten
that the persecution and execution of witches reached their peak at
the very time when Galileo and Newton were making their momen-
tous contributions to the knowledge of nature, when the Accademia
del Cimento and the Royal Society were reaching out toward greater
and greater scientific heights. Knowledge in and by itself does not
humanize man. One of the greatest paradoxes of our historv is that
singularcontradiction between the deep-seated humanism from which
medicine sprang and the not less singular manner in which medicine
at certain periods lost man whom it had set itself to salvage from
frailty and ills. Evidently something more than the mere knowl-
edge or lack of knowledge of certain facts was responsible for this
strange failure of a science which showed so much heroism, such
ability for self-sacrifice, such keenness of observation, and such
tenacity of effort. Even the wonderful efforts of John Weyer in
the sixteenth century did little to awaken medicine to a new orienta-
tion. Weyer attempted to resuscitate Hippocratism. He urged his
colleagues and the entrenched monks to recall the assertion that
mental diseases are natural, organic, and not sacred, supernatural,
diseases. This appeal could not result in much more than a revival
of Hippocratic humoralism and Galenic neurophysiology. Man in
his totality was still to be found or even discovered. This explains
why even Paracelsus could advise a certain amount of torture and
Ambroise Pare a burning at the stake of the mentally sick.
Humanism in the true sense of the word did not assert itself
until the sixteenth century, but even its pressure then could not stop
that certain deterioration of human values which gradually pene-
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trated into the medical profession and therefore into the practice
of medicine. At the very height of humanisnm, in the days of Eras-
mus, of the luminous personality, of Thomas More, and the inspired
warmth of Juan Luis Vives, the medical profession, because of its
peculiar, purely organic orientation, showed a correspondingly sub-
stantial deterioration of humanistic values.
The railleries of Frangois Rabelais, despite their extravagance,
reflected in substance the true spirit of the time: the deterioration,
the materialistic egotism, the self-assured formalism which then
characterized medicine. Rabelais,* it is reported, "was kneeling once
at church, before the statue of King Charles VIII. A monk came
and said to him, that doubtless he mistook that king's statue for that
of some saint; but Rabelais immediately replied; 'I am not so much
a monk (blockhead, I mean) as thou thinkest me; nor yet so blind
as not to know that I kneel before the representation of King
Charles VIII, for whose soul I was praying, because he brought the
pox out of Naples into this kingdom, by which means I and other
physicians have been considerable gainers.'"
Another instructive episode: Rabelais' great protector Cardinal
du Bellay became ill, apparenitly with a profound depression, as we
would say today. "Several physicians being once assembled to con-
sult about an hypochondriacal humour, which confined Cardinal
du Bellay to his bed; they at last resolved that an aperitive (open-
ing) decoction should be prepared, to be frequently taken with some
syrup by the patient. Now Rabelais, who was his physician, perhaps
not being of their opinion, while the rest of our learned doctors were
still discoursing in their scientific jargon, to deserve the large fee,
caused a fire to be made in the yard, and on it to be set a kettle full
of water, into which he had put as many keys as he could get: and
while he was very busy in stirring them about with a 3tick, the
doctors coming down, saw him, *and asked what he was doing?
'Following your directions,' replied he. 'How in the name of
Galen?' cried one of them. 'You are for something that may be
verv aperitive,' returned Rabelais, 'and by Hippocrates, I think you
will own that nothing can be more aperitive than keys, unless you
would have me send to the arsenal for some pieces of cannon.' This
odd fancy, being immediately related to the sick cardinal, set him
* "The Life of Rabelais," in The Works of Francis Rabelais, translated by Sir
Thomas Urquhart and Motteux. London, H. G. Bohn, 1849, vol. 1, p. 12.
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into such a fit of laughing, that it helped more to cure him than the
prescription; and what made the jest the more pertinent wvas, that
keys are made of iron and steel, which with water are the chief
ingredients in chalybeate medicines."*
III
It was the cultural revolution of the Renaissance that aroused
man to the awareness of the value of the human personality. Out
of this awareness was born a new European; adventurous, self-asser-
tive, rebellious, inquisitive, iconoclastic, daring, and impertinent.
To be a man and to respect the humanness in man became the true
if not fully outspoken ideal of European civilization. The spirit of
Roger Bacon returned from the thirteenth century armed with the
new, sixteenth century weapons of social conscousness. But history
and especially ideas move slowly, and only very slowly do they bear
fruit. It was not until the whole feudal system began to totter that
humanism began to show signs of becoming a true, constructive force
in the field of medicine. Toward the end of the eighteenth century
the trend of greater respect for the human personality, for the free-
dom of the individual, and for the social rehabilitation of those who
by material or psychological misfortune were derailed from the
normal path of life became fully crystallized.
It was at this time that psychiatry seems to have reappeared in
full force, as if from the unknown. Again, out of the ranks of the
medical profession, as in Ancient Greece, came men who proclaimed
that a mentally sick person was really sick and really a person. At
first this new trend appeared in England and in France, and here
the emphasis was laid primarily on kindness, on philanthropic con-
cern about and friendly care of the mentally ill. The names of the
Tukes and the Pinels grace this phase of psychiatry; hospitals were
organized, and the "insane" were freed from their chains.
But the true problem of mental illness as a medical problem was
still approached in an impersonal way. It still appeared to be a
question of humors, anatomical malformations, cerebral accidents,
and physiological malfunctions. The texts of Hippocrates and
Galen were paraphrased in the light of the greater knowledge of
pathological anatomy, but the fundamental attitude remained the
same. The physician was still interested in the typical forms and
* Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 12, 13.
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not in the psychological content of mental illness. From this atti-
tude, the direct outgrowth of the old Hippocratic trend, there devel-
oped the singular propensity to accumulate endless classifications and
pseudo-systematic nosologies-a phenomenon which did not reach its
logical conclusion of sterility till the very end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Here again we witness the same attempt to salvage the men-
tally ill from prejudice and superstition, the same endeavor to bring
psychiatry into the fold of medicine-and the same fundamental,
inner contradiction: the personality of the mentally ill was taken into
the fold only to be depersonalized and reduced to purely anatomico-
physiological categories.
That the cause of this continued miscarriage of medical intent lay
not in lack of knowledge should hardly be doubted; science, philos-
ophy, and technology had made immense strides toward the end of
the eighteenth century. The fault lay more with the unreadiness
of the cultural atmosphere. Before the true meaning of the human
personality could be discovered, and before, as a result of this dis-
covery, the concept of personality could be introduced into psychia-
try, it was necessary to have the French Revolution, the Napoleonic
conquest of Europe, and the passing of Napoleon. It was necessary
to assimilate the ideas of liberty, national and individual. It was
necessarythoroughlyto absorb into one's consciousness the new value
of man which the humanists of the sixteenth century had proclaimed
over two hundred years before. The assertion of Heraclitus in the
fifth century before Christ, that man is the measure of all things-
a statement forgotten, if it was ever remembered-now began to
reacquire a true meaning.
It is extremely curious and even puzzling to observe in this con-
nection that the true pre-occupation of psychiatry with the value of
the human personality, the true search for a psycho-biological foun-
dation of a medical psychology-the truly humanistic approach to
psychiatric problems-took place not in France, nor in England
where modern psychiatry was born, but in Germany after the libera-
tion from the mastery of Napoleon. Perhaps this apparent paradox
is explained by the fact that Germany in the first half of the nine-
teenth century tasted the sweetness of the new philosophies of free-
dom while experiencing the bitter discomfort of Napoleonic inva-
sions; it is impossible to say. There were without doubt many
cultural determinants which made the Germany of the time the
source of a new and different point of view.
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From the days of Georg Stahl (1660-1734) and his disciple
Langermann (1768-1832), the old Hippocratic thought of a vital
force took on a new and deeper meaning in certain quarters of Euro-
pean medicine. The generations which followed these men broke
up into two hostile and constantly warring camps. The camp of
the so-called somatologists, who seemed both more numerous and
moreinfluential, represented the French Hippocratico-Galenic tradi-
tion, while the humanistic, romantic psychologists, few and not so
influential in actual life, laid the foundation for a new, more rational
and more scientific psychiatry which did not even partially come into
its own until the beginning of the twentieth century.
IV
The generation of medical men whom we have in mind was born
in the latter part of the eighteenth century. It matured approxi-
mately at the time of the Battle of Austerlitz and the meeting of
Erfurt and the Battle of Jena, and it lived through the upheavals
of the Revolution of 1848. In other words, it was a generation
whose personalities were forged in the heat of great political and
economic changes, but they were also deeply imbued with the tradi-
tion of piety, learning, and contemplative pre-occupation with man,
his duties, his opportunities, and his rights. This was the period in
Germany which came closest to that period of pietas literata which
was characteristic of England before Henry VIII's first divorce, and
of Bruges where Erasmus and Vives lived in the early years of the
sixteenth century.
This German generation differed considerably from that which
had just preceded it. The generation of Heinroth and Reil was
more self-willed, more practical, and yet still more interested in the
abstract principle of goodness than in the practical problems of right.
Heinroth and Reil still felt that mental disease came from evil, from
sin; their psychiatry was a mixture of organizational endeavors and
theological righteousness. To them man lived and was well only
in order to be virtuous. To Groos, Nasse, or Ideler, of the next
generation, man lived and was well in order to be free and there-
foregood. Whatever mistakes these younger men madeinthetheory
or the practice of psychiatry, their greatest contribution lay in the
fact that they authoritatively insisted that unless natural sciences-
anatomy, pathology, and physiology-were brought together with a
trueknowledgeofman,nomedicalpsychologywaspossible. Inother
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words, they established the true need for a scientific psychology of
man which could be attained only through the synthesis of biology
and social sciences. They did not use these contemporary terms, of
course. They still spoke of philosophy and of anthropology, the
latter having a somewhat more restricted meaning than it has today.
Tradition does not look kindly upon the scientific rOle of these
representatives of delayed hunmanism in Germany. They are con-
sidered mystics, idealists, philosophers who confused and weakened
rather than clarified and strengthened psychological medicine. That
this judgment onthepart of theirsuccessors is not just or historically
correct is proved by the fact that in present-day psychiatry, outside
the ultraconservative remnants ofdescriptive systematizers, one finds
many an idea of Groos, Nasse, and Ideler, anonymously or under
a different name, taken root and empirically workable.
Friedrich Groos (1768-1852) was being prepared for the career
oflawyer and philosopher but abandoned law without regret in favor
of medicine. He was city physician in Karlsruhe and was the first
medical director of theHospital at Pforzheim, at that time a hospital
five hundred years old (founded in 1322) and receivingboth medical
and psychiatric patients. Groos was a very religious man; his fav-
orite authors were Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. He was dubbed
"Thle Philosopher-Physician." It was his orientation rather than
any systematic contribution that gives him an honorable place in the
history of psychiatry. Perhaps this orientation is best expressed in
the title of an artide he published in 1849: "The Road through the
Fore-court of Political Liberty to the Temple of Moral Freedom."
He pondered the problem of illness, having in mind primarily men-
tal illness. He thought that mental disease, unlike organic disease,
was a lack of something, a reduction of activity, a certain form of
passivity. Mental health was freedom of the soul (spontaneity of
the ego, as we would say today). Passions (affects) were the main
causative agents of mental illness.
It is clear that Groos had a definite sense of the value of the
human personality, and it was in the detailed study of this person-
ality that he sawthe possibility ofsolvingthe riddle ofmental illness.
It is also dear that he should be looked upon not as a philosophizing
physician who deviated from medicine as such, but rather as a true
physician who was one of the very first to bring into medicine the
concept ofpersonality as awhole. Hethus reintroduced or returned
to psychological medicine the humanistic mainspring from which it
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had started and which it seemed to have lost under the pressure of
a mass of cultural contradictions. Medicine had always valued
human life, but unless this value was also extended to the human
personality, psychological medicine was destined to remain a step-
child of medicine, or its unwanted and misunderstood appendage.
Groos did not speak in these terms, and perhaps he did not even
consciously seek such a profound synthesis of medicine and psychi-
atry, but historically he undoubtedly presented this orientation.
A more articulate effort in this direction was made by his contem-
porary Friedrich Nasse (1778-1851). Nasse was not a trained
psychiatrist. There were none in those days; psychiatry had not yet
become a separate medical specialty. But he was a pupil of Reil
and was therefore exposed early to psychiatric interests. Nasse
appreciated the importance of this branch of medicine for every
doctor. He made it his habit to demoinstrate to his medical students
a few mental patients daily. He was a good medical man, deeply
interested in research and diagnosis. He worked mostly in the
hospital at Bonn. He was interested in percussion and devised a
special cylinder for that purpose. In his clinic one heard frequently
of "cylinder symptoms." He used a special instrument called the
thanatometer, a queerly sounding name suggesting the measurement
of death. Nasse used the instrument to measure the stomach tem-
perature of the dead and to watch its gradual fall.
One would search in vain for signs of Nasse's deviation from
medicine in favor of psychiatry. These two branches were to him
parts of the whole of the healing art. As early as 1818 he began
publishing his Zeitschrift filr psychische Aerzte, historically the first
psychiatric journal. Nasse's responsiveness to the currents of psy-
chiatric thought is reflected in his publications. In 1820 to the name
of the Zeitschrift he added mit besonderer Beruicksichtigung des
Magnetism-us. In 1823 it became the Zeitschrift far die Anthro-
pologie. Groos published some of his contributions here.
Nasse was not interested inthe accumulation of lists of symptoms.
He was more concerned with the relationships between symptoms,
and was particularly interested in therapy. The Zeitschrift ceased
publication in 1826, and by 1830 Nasse began to publish the Jahr-
bilcher filr Anthropologie and zur Pathologie -und Therapie des
Irreveyns. His general medical research was not abandoned, how-
ever. In 1835 he issued (in collaboration with his son) his Unter-
suschungen zur Physiologie und Pathologie, and in 1838 he began,
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with Jacobi, the Zeitschrift fur die Beurtheilung und Heilung der
krankhaften Seelenzustdnde.
This term, "pathological mental states," is of more than passing
importance. Nasse betrays here a fully modern appreciation of
psychiatric problems. He is opposed to classifications, for he con-
siders them artificial; he is interested in the functioning of the per-
sonality. He doubts whether one has a right to ascribe mental
disease to any special organ. He opposes Gall and Spurzheim and
does not believe that the seat of mental diseases is in the brain. It
is in the person and not in any anatomical entity. Affects play a
serious role in the etiology of mental diseases. To be sure, body
organs affect our state of mind and our state of mind affects our
body organs. Nasse was the first to introduce the term "psycho-
somatic" medicine, a term which has gained so much popularity in
recent years. He sought to investigate affective reactions and other
psychological states of animals; he wished to study the phenomenon
of sleep from the psycho-somatic point of view. In other words, he
had some sort of intuitive thought about genetic psychology and,
finally deviating completely from the Hippocratic-Galenic tradition,
he attempted to presernt a unitary picture of man from the stand-
point of his total functioning. He thought that affects were mostly
inter-related in a recprocal way with the organs of the thorax, while
instincts were correspondingly related with the organs of the
abdomen.
Nasse might in some respects be considered a representative of
traditional, organically oriented medicine who would not, hiowever,
accept any psychiatry without psychology and who, following the
best tradition of humanism, attempted to weld psychiatry and medi-
cine into one system -of curative endeavor. This he did, not bv way
of speculation but by way of correlation of empirical data. To be
able even to attempt to do this one had toreach that level of cultural
development which not only gave one a sense of the human person-
ality but also the feeling that one may not exclude it from either
psychiatry or medicine. In this respect Nasse's younger contem-
porary Griesinger, who exerted such a great influence on German
psychiatry, stands out in great contrast. Griesinger was primarily a
pathologist and therefore, despite his great influence and contribu-
tion, he remained a formalistic Hippocratist who lost man among
man's organs.
Griesinger was the head of the Berlin Charite, a post he assumed
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in 1866, shortly after the death of its previous director, Carl Wil-
helm Ideler. The assumption of this office by Griesinger marked a
turn in psychiatry in general and in German psychiatry in partic-
ular. "Mental disease," exclaimed Griesinger, "is brain disease."
Virchow, whose influence was deservedly immense, was no minor
factor in this turn. Actually, it was not a new turn. It was a
reassertion on the part of clinical medicine and pathological anatomy
that only diseased organs are to be recognized, not diseased person-
alities. In this respect it was a definite reaction against humanism.
But before this reaction set in officially, as it were, the predecessor of
Griesinger stood out as the much misunderstood, and almost the last,
representative of German humanism in the psychiatry of the nine-
teenth century.
Carl Wilhelm Ideler ( 1795-1860) belonged to the same gener-
ation as Groos and Nasse. As a young man of twenty, he was in
Paris in his capacity of German military surgeon. He kept contact
with French psychiatry. He translated French psychiatric writers
into German and corresponded with Parchappe and Morel. Because
of the reaction which had already set in in German psychiatry, and
perhaps also because he occupied for almost twenty years the respon-
sible position of Director of the Charite in Berlin, Ideler's contem-
poraries treated him more harshly than they had Friedrich Groos,
whose position was less conspicuous. Ideler was not called "the
philosopher-physician" but "the mystical obscurantist" or "a ruin of
the past standing out in modern life." Yet Ideler was peculiarly
the son ofhis age, and ofavery humanistic age whose passing seemed
to be again in order.
Ideler was fully aware of the parentage of his ideas. He was
a pupil of Langermann, the man who was the living link between
Georg Stahl and later German psychiatry; Georg Stahl-unde-
servedly now forgotten-was the father of modern vitalism and a
great force in the psychological conceptions which did not mature
until the beginning of the twentieth century. Ideler translated
Stahl's Theoria Medica and wrote an article with the title, "Langer-
mann und Stahl als Begrfunder der Seelenheilkunde." That in many
respects Langermann and Stahl were the true founders of psycho-
pathology as we understand it today is undoubtedly true, but Ideler,
who followed them, was treated at the time with considerable scorn
and ridicule.
He was the forerunner of Moebius in that he made a pathogra-
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phic study of Luther and made a study of religious psychopathology
(1848), a work of which Alexander von Humboldt thought very
highly. In 1851 Ideler published a textbook on Legal Psychology.
He insisted that one should study carefully the subjective states of
mental patients, a demand almost unheard of in those days. He
thought that affects, passions, are the most important determinants
of mental diseases and that they exert considerable effect on our
body organs. The face of man is important. It reflects man's true
state of mind. Although he was much interested in physiognomy,
facial expressions alone would not suffice-he believed that a clear
and detailed description of the feelings and thoughts of the patients
was imperative. Ideler's case histories are not only exemplary but
they represent one of the very first attempts to introduce detailed
biographical methods of studying psychiatric patients, much in the
manner of our best psychiatric case records of today. In 1841 he
published a collection of such case histories entitled Biographieen
Geisteskranker in ihrer psychologischen Entwsickelung dargestellt.
He was the first psychiatrist to sketch in almost modern terms what
we know today as a psychological conflict and as psychic pain. To
him the human personality was a constellation of forces which mani-
fested themselves through various subjective states, primarily
through affects. A certain psychological tonus is maintained, an
equilibrium; any disturbance in this tonusleads to disease. In other
words, whatever the psychological conceptions of Ideler were, and
regardless of the fact that they were expressed in the somewhat
vague language of the time, Ideler did have a dynamic, psycho-
biological conception of personality, and he did feel that the doctor,
to be a psychiatrist, must be a scientific psychologist of the subjective
states of man-a humanistic orientation. Healthy life was psycho-
logical tension properly equilibrated.
Ideler speaks also of the moral and spiritual freedom of man as
a sign of mental health, and the motto for his Die allgenmine
Diatetik fiir Gebildete (1846) states: "He who has strength has
everything; he who has not, has nothing." Under strength (Kraft)
Ideler undoubtedly had in mind the Lebenskraft in Stahl's sense of
the word-something akin to the life force, to the elan vital, to the
drives of today.
Ideler was the last representative of psychiatric humanism in
Germany. From the time of his death German psychiatry almost
sharply turned away from the tradition which proved but a tenuous
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thread in the history of German medical psychology extending from
Stahl to Ideler. From the time of Ideler's death till the dose of
the century, barring a few exceptions, German psychiatry receded to
old, misconceived Hippocratism in modern dress. Wittingly and
unwittingly it served the disindividualizing trends of the growing
German State and Empire. When, at the beginning of the century,
new trends reappeared, trends reminiscent of Nasse and even of
Ideler (Gruhle, Kretschmer), they were destined to be but short-
lived in Germany. They grew in substance and scientific stature,
particularly through the contributions of Bleuler and Freud, until
the present crisis divested German psychiatry from any intellectual
independence.
It is highly instructive to those who are interested in the general
history of our culture to note that the humanistic trends in German
psychiatry coincided with the best strivings for true freedom, and of
course this is true not of Germany alone.